The Sceptick

(I)

Sir Walter Raleigh’s SCEPTICK.

The SCEPTICK doth neither affirm, neither denie any Poſition: but doubteth of it, and oppoſeth his Reaſons againſt that which is affirmed, or denied, to juſtifie his not Conſenting.

HIs firſt Reaſon ariſeth, from the conſideration of the great differrence amongſt living Creatures, both in the matter and manner of their Generations, and the ſeveral Conſtitutions of their bodies.

  Some living Creatures are by copulation, and ſome without it, and that either by Fire, as Crickets in fornaces; or corrupt water, as Gnats; or ſlime, as Frogs; or dirt, as Worms; or herbs, as Canker-worms: ſome of aſhes, as Beetles; ſome of trees, as the Worms Pſenas bred in the wild Fig-tree; ſome of living creatures putrified, as Bees of Bulls, and Waſps of Horſes. By Copulation many creatures are brought forth alive, as Man; ſome in the egg, as Birds; ſome in an unſhapen piece of fleſh, as Bears. Theſe great differrences cannot but cauſe a divers and contrary temperament, and qualitie in thoſe creatures, and conſequently, a great diverſitie in their phantaſie and conceit; ſo that they apprehend one and the ſame object, yet they muſt do it after a divers manner; for is it not abſurd to affirm, That creatures differ ſo much in temperature, and yet agree in conceit concerning one and the ſame object?

  But¹ this will more plainly appear, if the inſtruments of Senſe in the body be obſerved: for we ſhall find, that as theſe inſtruments are affected and diſpoſed, ſo doth the Imagination conceit that which by them is connexed unto it. That very object which ſeemeth unto us White, unto them which have the Jaundiſe, ſeemeth Pale, and Red unto thoſe whoſe Eyes are bloud-ſhot. Forſomuch then as living creatures have ſome white, ſome pale, ſome red eyes why ſhould not one and the ſame object ſeem to ſome white, to ſome red, to ſome pale? If a man rub his eye, the figure of that which he beholdeth ſeemeth long, or narrow; is it then not likely, That thoſe creatures which have a long and ſlanting Pupil of the eye, as Goats, Foxes, Cats, &c. do convey the faſhion of that which they behold under another form to the imagination, than thoſe that have round Pupils do?

 Who knoweth not, that a Glaſs preſenteth the outward object ſmoother, or Greater, according to the making of the glaſs? If it be hollow, the object ſeemeth ſmaller than it is, if the glaſs be crooked, then the object ſeemeth long and narrow. And glaſſes there be, which preſent the head of him that looketh in them, downwards, & the heels upwards. Now then, ſeeing the eye which is the inſtrument of Sight, in ſome living creatures is more outward, in ſome more hollow, in ſome plain, in ſome greater, in ſome leſs; it is very probable, that Fiſhes, Men, Lions, and Dogs, whoſe eyes ſo much differ, do not conceive the ſelf ſame object after the ſame manner, but diverſly, according to the diverſitie of the eye, which offereth it unto the phantaſie.

The ſame reaſon² holdeth in Touching; for ſeemeth it not abſurd to think, that thoſe creatures, which are covered with Shels, thoſe which are covered with Scales, thoſe which are covered with Hairs, and thoſe which are Smooth, ſhould all be alike ſenſible in Touching? and every one of them conveigh the image, or qualitie of the ſame object which they touch, in the very ſame degree of heat or cold, of drineſs or moiſture, roughneſs or ſmoothneſs unto the imagination?

  So³ might it be ſhewed in Hearing: for how cã wẽ think that the Ear, which hath a narrow paſſage, and the Ear, which hath an open & wide paſſage, do receive the ſame ſound in the ſame degree? Or that the Ear; whoſe inſide is full of hair, doth hear in the ſame juſt meaſure, that the Ear doth whoſe inſide is ſmooth? Since experience ſheweth, that if we ſtop, or half ſtop our Ears, the ſound cometh not to us in the ſame manner & degree, that it doth if our ears be open?

 The like⁴ may be thought of Smelling, for man himſelf abounding with Fleagm, is otherwiſe affected in ſmelling, than he is, if the parts about the head be full of bloud; and many things afford a delightfull ſmell to ſome living creatures, which ſmel to other living creatures ſeemeth not to be ſo.

 In the Taſte⁵ the ſame reaſon appeareth; for to a rough and drie tongue, that very thing ſeemeth bitter (as in an Ague) which to the moiſter tongue ſeemeth not to be ſo. Divers creatures then having tongues drier, or moiſter, according to their ſeveral temperatures, when they taſt the ſame thing, muſt needs conceit it to be according as the inſtrument of their taſt is affected, either bitter, or ſweet, &c. For even as the hand in the ſtriking of the Harp, though the ſtroak be one, yet cauſeth a ſound, ſometimes high, ſometimes baſe, according to the qualitie of the ſtring that is ſtrucken. Even ſo one and the ſame outward object is diverſly judged of, and conceited, according to the ſeveral and divers qualities of the inſtrument of Sence, which conveieth it to the imagination. Oyntment is pleaſing to Man; but Beetles and Bees cannot abide it. Oyl to man is profitable; but it killeth Bees and Waſps. Cicuta feedeth Quails, and Henbane Sows; but both of theſe hurt Man. If a Man eat Ants he is ſick; but the Bear being ſick, recovereth by eating them. If then one and the very ſame thing to the red eye ſeem red, to another pale, and white to another: If one and the ſame thing, ſeem not hot or cold, drie or moiſt, in the ſame degree to the ſeveral creatures which touch it. If one and the ſelf-ſame ſound ſeem more ſhrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear, and more baſe to him that hath an open ear: If the ſame thing, at the ſame time, ſeem to afford a pleaſant and diſpleaſant Smell to divers and ſeveral creatures: If that ſeem bitter in taſt to one, which to another ſeemeth ſweet, that to one hurtfull, which to another ſeemeth healthful, I may report how theſe things appear divers to ſeverall creatures, and ſeem to produce divers effects.

 But what they are in their own nature, whether red or white, bitter or ſweet, healthfull or hurtfull, I cannot tell. For why ſhould I preſume to profer my conceit and imagination, in affirming that a thing is thus, or thus, in its own nature, becauſe it ſeemeth to me to be ſo, before the conceit of other living creatures, who may as well think it to be otherwiſe in each one nature, becauſe it appeareth otherwiſe to them than it doth to me?

  They are living creatures as well as I: why then ſhould I condemn their conceit and phantaſie, concerning any thing, more than they may mine? They may be in the truth and I in errour, as well as I in truth, and they err. If my conceit muſt be believed before theirs, great reaſon that it be proved to be truer than theirs. And this proof muſt be either by demonſtration, or without it; without it none will believe; Certainly, if by demonſtration, then this demonſtration muſt ſeem to be true, or not ſeem to be true; if it ſeem to be true, then will it be a queſtion, whether it be ſo indeed as it ſeemeth to be; and to alleadge that for a certain proof, which is uncertain and queſtionable, ſeemeth abſurd.

  If it be ſaid, that the imagination of Man judgeth truer of outward object, than the imagination of other living creatures doth, & therefore to be credited above others, (beſides that which is already ſaid) this is eaſily refuted by comparing of Man with other creatures.

  It is confeſſed, the Dog excelleth Man in ſmell, and in hearing: and whereas there is ſaid to be a twofold diſcourſe, one of the mind, another of the tongue and that of the mind is ſaid to be exerciſed in chaſing that which is convenient, and refuſing that which is hurtfull in knowledge, juſtice, & thankfulnes: This creature chuſeth his food, refuſeth the whip, fawneth on his Maſter, defendeth his houſe, revengeth himſelf of theſe ſtrangers that hurt him. And Homer mentioneth Argus, the dog of Uliſſes, who knew his maſter, having been from home ſo many years, that at his return, all the people of his houſe had forgot him. This creature, ſaith Chryſippus, is not void of Logick: for when in following any beaſt, he cõmeth to three ſeverall ways, he ſmelleth to the one, & then to the ſecond, and if he find that the beaſt which he purſueth be not fled one of theſe 2 ways, he preſently without ſmelling any further to it, taketh the third way, which, ſaith the ſame Philoſopher, is as it he reaſoned thus, the Beaſt muſt be gone either this, or this, or the other way; but neither this nor this; Ergò, the third: and ſo away he runneth.

  If we conſider his ſkill in Phyſick, it is ſufficient to help himſelf; if he be wounded with a dart, he uſeth the help of his Teeth to take it out, of his Tongue to cleanſe the wound from corruption; he ſeemeth to be well acquainted with the Precept of Hippocrates, who ſaith, that the Reſt of the Foot is the Phyſick of the Foot, and therefore if his foot be hurt, he holdeth it up that it may reſt; if he be ſick, he giveth himſelf a Vomit by eating of Graſs, and recovereth himſelf. The Dog then we ſee is plentifully furniſhed with inward diſcourſe.

  Now outward ſpeech is not needfull to make a creature Reaſonable, elſe a dumb Man were an unreaſonable Creature.

  And do not Philoſophers themſelves reject this as an enẽie to knowledg? & therefore they are Silea when they are inſtructed; and yet even as Barbarous and ſtrange people of ſpeech, but we underſtand it not, neither do we perceive any great difference in their words: but a difference there ſeemeth to be, and they do expres their thoughts and meanings one to another by thoſe words. Evẽ ſo thoſe creatures, which are commonly called unreaſonable, do ſeem to parlie one with another; and by their ſpeech to underſtand one the other. Do not Birds by one kind of ſpeech call their young ones, and by another cauſe them to hide themſelves? do they not by their ſeveral voices expreſs their ſeveral paſſions of joy, of grief, of fear in ſuch manner, that their fellows underſtand them? Do they not by their voice foreſhew things to come? But we will return to that creature we firſt did inſtance in. The Dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth, another when he howleth, another when he is beaten, and another when he is angry. Theſe creatures then are not void of outward ſpeech.

 If then theſe creatures excell Man in ſence, & are equal to him in inward & outward diſcourſe, why ſhould not their conceits & imaginations conveigh the outward object in as true a manner as ours? and if ſo, then ſeeing their imaginations are divers, and they conceit it diverſly according to their divers temperaments, I may tell what the outward object ſeemeth to me; but what it ſeemeth to other creatures, or whether it be indeed that which it ſeemeth to me, or any other of them, I know not.

 But be it granted, that the Iudgement of Man in this caſe, is to be preferred before the Iudgement of Beaſts; yet in Men there is great difference; both in reſpect of the outward ſhape, and alſo of the temperature of their bodies: For the bodie of the Scythian differeth in ſhape from the bodie of the Indian, the reaſon of it ariſeth (ſay the Dogmatiques ) from a predominancie of humours in the one more than in the other; and as ſeverall humours are predominant, ſo are the phantaſies and conceits ſeverally framed and effected. So that our countrey men delight in one thing, the Indian not in that, but in another which we regard not. This would not be, if their conceits and ours were both a like; for then we ſhould like that which they do, and they would diſlike that which we would diſlike. It is evident alſo, that men differ very much in the temperature of their bodies, elſe why ſhould ſome more eaſily digeſt Bief than Shel-fiſh? and other be mad for the time, if they drink wine? There was an old woman about Arbeus, which drunk three drams of Cicuta (every dram weighing ſixtie Barley corns, and eight drams to an ounce) without hurt. Lyſis, without hurt, took four drams of Poppie; and Demophon, which was GentlemanSewer to Alexander, was very cold whẽ he ſtood in the ſun, or in a hot bath; but very hot when he ſtood in the ſhadow. Athenagoras felt no pain if a Scorpion ſtung him. And the Pſilli (a people in Lybia, whoſe bodies are venom to ſerpents) if they be ſtung by ſerpents, or Aſps, receive no hurt at all.

  The Ethiopians, which inhabit the river Hydaſpis, do eat ſerpents and ſcorpions without danger. Lothericus a Chyrurgian, at the ſmell of a Sturgeon, would be for the time mad. Andron of Argos, was ſo little thirſtie, that without want of drink, he travelled through the hot and dry countrey of Lybia. Tyberius Ceſar, would ſee very well in the dark. Ariſtotle, mentioneth of Thratius, who ſaid, that the image of a Man went always before him.

 If then it be ſo, that there be ſuch differences in Men, this muſt be by reaſon of the divers temperatures they have, and divers diſpoſition of their conceit and imagination; for, if one hate, and another love the very ſame thing, it muſt be that their phantaſies differ, elſe all would love it, or all would hate it. Theſe Men then, may tell how theſe things ſeem to them good, or bad; but what they are in their own Nature they cannot tell.

  If we will hearken to mens opinions, concerning one and the ſame matter, thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it, we ſhall find this to be impoſſible; for, either we muſt believe what all men ſay of it, or what ſome men only ſay of it. To believe what all men ſay of one & the ſame thing, is not poſſible; for then we ſhall believe Contrarieties; for ſome men ſay, That that very thing is pleaſant, which other ſay is diſpleaſant. If it be ſaid, we muſt believe onely ſome men, then let it be ſhewed who thoſe ſome men are; for the Platoniſts will believe Plato, but the Epicures Epicurus, the Phytagorians Pythagorus and other Philoſophers, the maſters of their own Sects: ſo that it is doubtfull, to which of all theſe we ſhall give credit. If it be ſaid, that we muſt credit the greateſt number; this ſeemeth childiſh, for there may be amongſt other Nations a greater number which denie that very point, which the greateſt number with us do affirm: ſo that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed.

   This Argument ſeemeth to be further confirmed, if the differences of the Sences of Hearing, Seeing, Smelling, Touching, and Taſting be conſidered; for that the Sences differ, it ſeemeth plain.

  Painted Tables (in which the art of Slanting is uſed) appear to the Eye, as if the parts of them were ſome higher, and ſome lower than the other, but to the Touch they ſeem not to be ſo.

  Honey ſeemeth to the Tongue ſweet, but unpleaſant to the Eye: ſo Oyntment doth recreate the Smell, but it offendeth the Taſt. Rain-water is profitable to the Eyes, but it hurteth the Lungs. We may tell then, how theſe things ſeem to our ſeverall ſences, but what they are in their own nature we cannot tell: for why ſhould not a man credit any one of his ſences as well as the other?

  Every object ſeemeth to be preſented diverſly unto the ſeverall inſtruments of Sence. An Apple to the Touch ſeemeth ſmooth, ſweet to the Smell, and to the Eye yellow; but whether the Apple have one of theſe qualities onely, or more than theſe qualities, who can tell? The Organ hath many Pipes, all which are filled with the ſame blaſt of wind, varied according to the capacitie of the ſeveral Pipes which receive it: even ſo the qualitie of the Apple may be but one, and that this one quality may be varied, & ſeem yellow to the Eye, to the Touch ſmooth, and ſweet to the Smell, by reaſon of the divers inſtruments of the Sence, which apprehend this one quality diverſly.

  It may be alſo, that an Apple hath many qualities beſides; but we are not able to conceive them all; becauſe we want fit means and inſtruments to apprehend them: for ſuppoſe that ſome Man is born blind, and deaf, and yet can touch, ſmell, and taſt; this man will not think that there is any thing, which may be ſeen or heard, becauſe he wanteth the Sences of hearing and ſeeing, he will onely think there are thoſe qualities in the object, which by reaſon of his three Sences he conceiveth: Even ſo the Apple may have many more qualities; but we cannot come to know them, becauſe we want fit inſtruments for that purpoſe.

 If it be replied, that Nature hath ordained as many inſtruments of Sence, as there are ſenſible objects; I demand, What Nature? For there is a confuſed controverſie about the very Eſſence of Nature. Some affirming it to be one thing, others another, few agreeing: ſo that what the quality of an Apple is, or whether it hath one qualitie or many, I know not.

  Let a man alſo conſider, how many things that are ſeperated, and by themſelves appear to differ from that which they ſeem to be, when they are in a maſs or lump; the ſcrapings of the Goats horn ſeems white, but in the horn they ſeem black, but in the lump white. The ſtone Tænarus, being poliſhed, ſeemeth white, but unpoliſhed & rough it ſeemeth yellow. Sands being ſeperated, appear rough to the Touch, but a great heap, ſoft. I may then report, how theſe things appear, but whether they are ſo indeed, I know not.