(I)SirWalterRaleigh’sSCEPTICK.TheSCEPTICKdoth neither affirm, neither denie any Poſition: but doubteth of it,and oppoſeth his Reaſons againſt that which is affirmed, ordenied, to juſtifie his not Conſenting.firſt Reaſon ariſeth, from the conſideration of the greatdifferrence amongſt living Creatures, both in the matter and mannerof their Generations, and the ſeveral Conſtitutions of theirbodies.
Someliving Creatures are by copulation, and ſome without it, and thateither by Fire, as Crickets in fornaces; or corrupt water, as Gnats;or ſlime, as Frogs; or dirt, as Worms; or herbs, as Canker-worms:ſome of aſhes, as Beetles; ſome of trees, as the Worms
Pſenasbredin the wild Fig-tree; ſome of living creatures putrified, as Bees ofBulls, and Waſps of Horſes. By Copulation many creatures arebrought forth alive, as Man; ſome in the egg, as Birds; ſome in anunſhapen piece of fleſh, as Bears. Theſe great differrences cannotbut cauſe a divers and contrary temperament, and qualitie in thoſecreatures, and conſequently, a great diverſitie in their phantaſieand conceit; ſo that they apprehend one and the ſame object, yetthey muſt do it after a divers manner; for is it not abſurd toaffirm, That creatures differ ſo much in temperature, and yet agreein conceit concerning one and the ſame object?
But
this will more plainly appear, if the inſtruments of Senſe in thebody be obſerved: for we ſhall find, that as theſe inſtrumentsare affected and diſpoſed, ſo doth the Imagination conceit thatwhich by them is connexed unto it. That very object which ſeemethunto us White, unto them which have the Jaundiſe, ſeemeth Pale, andRed unto thoſe whoſe Eyes are bloud-ſhot. Forſomuch then asliving creatures have ſome white,
ſomepale, ſome red eyes why ſhould not one and the ſame object ſeemto ſome white, to ſome red, to ſome pale? If a man rub his eye,the figure of that which he beholdeth ſeemeth long, or narrow; is itthen not likely, That thoſe creatures which have a long and ſlantingPupil of the eye, as Goats, Foxes, Cats,
&c.do convey the faſhion of that which they behold under another formto the imagination, than thoſe that have roundPupilsdo?
Whoknoweth not, that a Glaſs preſenteth the outward object ſmoother,or
Greater,according to the making
ofthe glaſs? If it be hollow, the object ſeemeth ſmaller than it is,if the glaſs be crooked, then the object ſeemeth long and narrow.And glaſſes there be, which preſent the head of him that lookethin them, downwards, & the heels upwards. Now then, ſeeing theeye which is the inſtrument of Sight, in ſome living creatures ismore outward, in ſome more hollow, in ſome plain, in ſome greater,in ſome leſs; it is very probable, that Fiſhes, Men, Lions, andDogs, whoſe eyes ſo much differ, do not conceive the ſelf ſameobject after the ſame manner, but diverſly, according to thediverſitie of the eye, which offereth it unto the phantaſie.
Theſame reaſon
holdeth in Touching; for ſeemeth it not abſurd to think, that thoſecreatures, which are covered with Shels, thoſe which are coveredwith Scales, thoſe which are covered with Hairs, and thoſe whichare Smooth, ſhould all be alike ſenſible in Touching? and everyone of them conveigh the image, or qualitie of the ſame object whichthey touch, in the very ſame degree of heat or cold, of drineſs ormoiſture, roughneſs or ſmoothneſs unto the imagination?
So
might it be ſhewed in Hearing: for how cã wẽ think that the Ear,which hath a narrow paſſage, and the Ear, which hath an open &wide paſſage, do receive the ſame ſound in the ſame degree? Orthat the Ear; whoſe inſide is full of hair, doth hear in the ſamejuſt meaſure, that the Ear doth whoſe inſide is ſmooth? Sinceexperience ſheweth, that if we ſtop, or half ſtop our Ears, theſound cometh not to us in the ſame manner & degree, that itdoth if our ears be open?
The like
may be thought
ofSmelling, for man himſelf abounding with Fleagm, is otherwiſeaffected in ſmelling, than he is, if the parts about the head befull of bloud; and many things afford a delightfull ſmell to ſomeliving creatures, which ſmel to other living creatures ſeemeth notto be ſo.
Inthe Taſte
the ſame reaſon appeareth; for to a rough and drie tongue, thatvery thing ſeemeth bitter (as in an Ague) which to the moiſtertongue ſeemeth not to be ſo. Divers creatures then having tonguesdrier, or moiſter, according to their ſeveral temperatures, whenthey taſt the ſame thing, muſt needs conceit it to be according asthe inſtrument of their taſt is affected, either bitter, or ſweet,
&c.For even as the hand in the ſtriking of the Harp, though the ſtroakbe one, yet cauſeth a ſound, ſometimes high, ſometimes baſe,according to the qualitie of the ſtring that is ſtrucken. Even ſoone and the ſame outward object is diverſly judged of, andconceited, according to the ſeveral and divers qualities of theinſtrument of Sence, which conveieth it to the imagination. Oyntmentis pleaſing to Man; but Beetles and Bees cannot abide it. Oyl to manis profitable; but it killeth Bees and Waſps. Cicuta feedeth Quails,and Henbane Sows; but both of theſe hurt Man. If a Man eat Ants heis ſick; but the Bear being ſick, recovereth by eating them. Ifthen one and the very ſame thing to the red eye ſeem red, toanother pale, and white to another: If one and the ſame thing, ſeemnot hot or cold, drie or moiſt, in the ſame degree to the ſeveralcreatures which touch it. If one and the ſelf-ſame ſound ſeemmore ſhrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear, and more baſeto him that hath an open ear: If the ſame thing, at the ſame time,ſeem to afford a pleaſant and diſpleaſant Smell to divers andſeveral creatures: If that ſeem bitter in taſt to one, which toanother ſeemeth ſweet, that to one hurtfull, which to anotherſeemeth healthful, I may report how theſe things appear divers toſeverall creatures, and ſeem to produce divers effects.
But whatthey are in their own nature, whether red or white, bitter or ſweet,healthfull or hurtfull, I cannot tell. For why ſhould I preſume toprofer my conceit and imagination, in affirming that a thing is thus,or thus, in its own nature, becauſe it ſeemeth to me to be ſo,before the conceit of other living creatures, who may as well thinkit to be otherwiſe in each one nature, becauſe it appearethotherwiſe to them than it doth to me?
Theyare living creatures as well as I: why then ſhould I condemn theirconceit and phantaſie, concerning any thing, more than they maymine? They may be in the truth and I in errour, as well as I intruth, and they err. If my conceit muſt be believed before theirs,great reaſon that it be proved to be truer than theirs. And thisproof muſt be either by demonſtration, or without it; without itnone will believe; Certainly, if by demonſtration, then thisdemonſtration muſt ſeem to be true, or not ſeem to be true; if itſeem to be true, then will it be a queſtion, whether it be ſoindeed as it ſeemeth to be; and to alleadge that for a certainproof, which is uncertain and queſtionable, ſeemeth abſurd.
If itbe ſaid, that the imagination of Man judgeth truer of outwardobject, than the imagination of other living creatures doth, &therefore to be credited above others, (beſides that which isalready ſaid) this is eaſily refuted by comparing of Man with othercreatures.
It isconfeſſed, the Dog excelleth Man in ſmell, and in hearing: andwhereas there is ſaid to be a twofold diſcourſe, one of the mind,another of the tongue and that of the mind is ſaid to be exerciſedin chaſing that which is convenient, and refuſing that which ishurtfull in knowledge, juſtice, & thankfulnes: This creaturechuſeth his food, refuſeth the whip, fawneth on his Maſter,defendeth his houſe, revengeth himſelf of theſe ſtrangers thathurt him. And
Homermentioneth
Argus,thedog
of
Uliſſes,who knew his maſter, having been from home ſo many years, that athis return, all the people of his houſe had forgot him. Thiscreature, ſaith
Chryſippus,is not void of Logick: for when in following any beaſt, he cõmethto three ſeverall ways, he ſmelleth to the one, & then to theſecond, and if he find that the beaſt which he purſueth be notfled one of theſe 2 ways, he preſently without ſmelling anyfurther to it, taketh the third way, which, ſaith the ſamePhiloſopher, is as it he reaſoned thus, the Beaſt muſt be goneeither this, or this, or the other way; but neither this nor this;
Ergò,the third: and ſo away he runneth.
If weconſider his ſkill in Phyſick, it is ſufficient to help himſelf;if he be wounded with a dart, he uſeth the help of his Teeth to takeit out, of his Tongue to cleanſe the wound from corruption; heſeemeth to be well acquainted with the Precept of
Hippocrates,who ſaith, that the Reſt of the Foot is the Phyſick of the Foot,and therefore if his foot be hurt, he holdeth it up that it may reſt;if he be ſick, he giveth himſelf a Vomit by eating of Graſs, andrecovereth himſelf. The Dog then we ſee is plentifully furniſhedwith inward diſcourſe.
Nowoutward ſpeech is not needfull to make a creature Reaſonable, elſea dumb Man were an unreaſonable Creature.
And donot Philoſophers themſelves reject this as an enẽie to knowledg?& therefore they are
Sileawhen they are inſtructed; and yet even as Barbarous and ſtrangepeople of ſpeech, but we underſtand it not, neither do we perceiveany great difference
intheir words: but a difference there ſeemeth to be, and they doexpres their thoughts and meanings one to another by thoſe words.Evẽ ſo thoſe creatures, which are commonly called unreaſonable,do ſeem to parlie one with another; and by their ſpeech tounderſtand one the other. Do not Birds by one kind of ſpeech calltheir young ones, and by another cauſe them to hide themſelves? dothey not by their ſeveral voices expreſs their ſeveral paſſionsof joy, of grief, of fear in ſuch manner, that their fellowsunderſtand them? Do they not by their voice foreſhew things tocome? But we will return to that creature we firſt did inſtance in.The Dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth, another when hehowleth, another when he is beaten, and another when he is angry.Theſe creatures then are not void of outward ſpeech.
If thentheſe creatures excell Man in ſence, & are equal to him ininward & outward diſcourſe, why ſhould not their conceits &imaginations conveigh the outward object in as true a manner as ours?and if ſo, then ſeeing their imaginations are divers, and theyconceit it diverſly according to their divers temperaments, I maytell what the outward object ſeemeth to me; but what it ſeemeth toother creatures, or whether it be indeed that which it ſeemeth tome, or any other of them, I know not.
But beit granted, that the Iudgement of Man in this caſe, is to bepreferred before the Iudgement of Beaſts; yet in Men there is greatdifference; both in reſpect of the outward ſhape, and alſo of thetemperature of their bodies: For the bodie of the
Scythiandiffereth in ſhape from the bodie of the
Indian,the reaſon of it ariſeth (ſay the Dogmatiques ) from apredominancie of humours in the one more than in the other; and asſeverall humours are predominant, ſo are the phantaſies andconceits ſeverally framed and effected. So that our countrey mendelight in one thing, the
Indiannot in that, but in another which we regard not. This would not be,if their conceits and ours were both a like; for then we ſhould likethat which they do, and they would diſlike that which we woulddiſlike. It is evident alſo, that men differ very much in thetemperature of their bodies, elſe why ſhould ſome more eaſilydigeſt Bief than Shel-fiſh? and other be mad for the time, if theydrink wine? There was an old woman about
Arbeus,which drunk three drams of
Cicuta(every dram weighing ſixtie Barley corns, and eight drams to anounce) without hurt.
Lyſis,without hurt, took four drams of Poppie; and
Demophon,which was GentlemanSewer to
Alexander,was very cold whẽ he ſtood in the ſun, or in a hot bath; but veryhot when he ſtood in the ſhadow.
Athenagorasfeltno pain if a Scorpion ſtung him. And the
Pſilli(a people in
Lybia,whoſe bodies are venom to ſerpents) if they be ſtung by ſerpents,or Aſps, receive no hurt at all.
The
Ethiopians,which inhabit the river
Hydaſpis,do eat ſerpents and ſcorpions without danger. Lo
thericusa Chyrurgian, at
theſmell of a Sturgeon, would be for the time mad.
Andronof
Argos,was ſo little thirſtie, that without want of drink, he travelledthrough the hot and dry countrey of
Lybia.
TyberiusCeſar,would ſee
verywell in the dark.
Ariſtotle,mentioneth of
Thratius,who ſaid, that the image of a Man went always before him.
If thenit be ſo, that there be ſuch differences in Men, this muſt be byreaſon of the divers temperatures they have, and divers diſpoſitionof their conceit and imagination; for, if one hate, and another lovethe very ſame thing, it muſt be that their phantaſies differ, elſeall would love it, or all would hate it. Theſe Men then, may tellhow theſe things ſeem to them good, or bad; but what they are intheir own Nature they cannot tell.
If wewill hearken to mens opinions, concerning one and the ſame matter,thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it, we ſhall find thisto be impoſſible; for, either we muſt believe what all men ſay ofit, or what ſome men only ſay of it. To believe what all men ſayof one & the ſame thing, is not poſſible; for then we ſhallbelieve Contrarieties; for ſome men ſay, That that very thing ispleaſant, which other ſay is diſpleaſant. If it be ſaid, we muſtbelieve onely ſome men, then let it be ſhewed who thoſe ſome menare; for the
Platoniſtswillbelieve
Plato,but the
EpicuresEpicurus,the
PhytagoriansPythagorusand other Philoſophers, the maſters of their own Sects: ſo that itis doubtfull, to which of all theſe we ſhall give credit. If it beſaid, that we muſt credit the greateſt number; this ſeemethchildiſh, for there may be amongſt other Nations a greater numberwhich denie that very point, which the greateſt number with us doaffirm: ſo that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed.
ThisArgument ſeemeth to be further confirmed, if the differences of theSences of
Hearing,
Seeing,
Smelling,
Touching,and
Taſtingbe
conſidered;for that the Sences differ, it ſeemeth plain.
PaintedTables (in which the art of Slanting is uſed) appear to the Eye, asif the parts of them were ſome higher, and ſome lower than theother, but to the Touch they ſeem not to be ſo.
Honeyſeemeth to the Tongue ſweet, but unpleaſant to the Eye: ſoOyntment doth recreate the Smell, but it offendeth the Taſt.Rain-water is profitable to the Eyes, but it hurteth the Lungs. Wemay tell then, how theſe things ſeem to our ſeverall ſences, butwhat they are in their own nature we cannot tell: for why ſhould nota man
creditany one of his ſences as well as the other?
Everyobject ſeemeth to be preſented diverſly unto the ſeverallinſtruments of Sence. An Apple to the Touch ſeemeth ſmooth, ſweetto the Smell, and to the Eye yellow; but whether the Apple have oneof theſe qualities onely, or more than theſe qualities, who cantell? The Organ hath many Pipes, all which are filled with the ſameblaſt of wind, varied according to the capacitie of the ſeveralPipes which receive it: even ſo the qualitie of the Apple may be butone, and that this one quality may be varied, & ſeem yellow tothe Eye, to the Touch ſmooth, and ſweet to the Smell, by reaſon ofthe divers inſtruments of the Sence, which apprehend this onequality diverſly.
It maybe alſo, that an Apple hath many qualities beſides; but we are notable to conceive them all; becauſe we want fit means and inſtrumentsto apprehend them: for ſuppoſe that ſome Man is born blind, anddeaf, and yet can touch, ſmell, and taſt; this man will not thinkthat there is any thing, which may be ſeen or heard, becauſe hewanteth the Sences of hearing and ſeeing, he will onely think thereare thoſe qualities in the object, which by reaſon of his threeSences he conceiveth: Even ſo the Apple may have many morequalities; but we cannot come to know them, becauſe we want fitinſtruments for that purpoſe.
If it bereplied, that Nature hath ordained as many inſtruments of Sence, asthere are ſenſible objects; I demand, What Nature? For there is aconfuſed controverſie about the very Eſſence of Nature. Someaffirming it to be one thing, others another, few agreeing: ſo thatwhat the quality of an Apple is, or whether it hath one qualitie ormany, I know not.
Let aman alſo conſider, how many things that are ſeperated, and bythemſelves appear to differ from that which they ſeem to be, whenthey are in a maſs or lump; the ſcrapings of the Goats horn ſeemswhite, but in the horn they ſeem black, but in the lump white. Theſtone
Tænarus,being poliſhed, ſeemeth white, but unpoliſhed & rough itſeemeth yellow. Sands being ſeperated, appear rough to the Touch,but a great heap, ſoft. I may then report, how theſe things appear,but whether they are ſo indeed, I know not.