The Sceptic

Sir Walter Ralegh’s SCEPTIC.

The SCEPTIC doth neither affirm, neither deny any position: but doubteth of it, and opposeth his reasons against that which is affirmed, or denied, to justify his not consenting.

His first reason ariseth from the consideration of the great difference amongst living creatures, both in the matter and manner of their generations, and the several constitutions of their bodies.

Some living creatures are by copulation, and some without it, and that either by fire, as crickets in furnaces; or corrupt water, as gnats; or slime, as frogs; or dirt, as worms; or herbs, as canker-worms: some of ashes,  as beetles; some of trees, as the worms Psenas  bred in the wild fig-tree; some of living creatures putrified, as bees of bulls, and wasps of horses. By copulation many creatures are brought forth alive, as man; some in the egg, as birds; some in an unshapen piece of flesh, as bears.  These great differences cannot but cause a divers and contrary temperament and quality in those creatures, and consequently, a great diversity in their phantasy and conceit; so that they apprehend one and the same object, yet they must do it after a divers manner; for is it not absurd to affirm, that creatures differ so much in temperature, and yet agree in conceit concerning one and the same object?

But  this will more plainly appear, if the instruments of sense in the body be observed: for we shall find, that as these instruments are affected and disposed, so doth the imagination conceit that which by them is connexed unto it. That very object which seemeth unto us white, unto them which have the jaundice, seemeth pale, and red unto those whose eyes are blood-shot. For so much then as living creatures have some white, some pale, some red eyes, why should not one and the same object seem to some white, to some red, to some pale? If a man rub his eye, the figure of that which he beholdeth seemeth long, or narrow; is it then not likely, that those creatures which have a long and slanting pupil of the eye, as goats, foxes, cats, etc. do convey the fashion of that which they behold under another form to the imagination, than those that have round pupils do?

Who knoweth not, that a glass presenteth the outward object smoother, or greater, according to the making of the glass? If it be hollow, the object seemeth smaller than it is, if the glass be crooked, then the object seemeth long and narrow. And glasses there be, which present the head of him that looketh in them, downwards, and the heels upwards. Now then, seeing the eye which is the instrument of sight, in some living creatures is more outward, in some more hollow, in some plain, in some greater, in some less; it is very probable, that fishes, men, lions, and dogs, whose eyes so much differ, do not conceive the self-same object after the same manner, but diversly, according to the diversity of the eye, which offereth it unto the phantasy.

The same reason  holdeth in touching; for seemeth it not absurd to think, that those creatures, which are covered with shells, those which are covered with scales, those which are covered with hairs, and those which are smooth, should all be alike sensible in touching? And every one of them convey the image, or quality of the same object which they touch, in the very same degree of heat or cold, of dryness or moisture, roughness or smoothness unto the imagination?

So  might it be showed in Hearing: for how can we think that the ear which hath a narrow passage, and the ear which hath an open and wide passage, do receive the same sound in the same degree? Or that the ear, whose inside is full of hair, doth hear in the same just measure, that the ear doth whose inside is smooth? Since experience showeth, that if we stop, or half-stop our ears, the sound cometh not to us in the same manner and degree, that it doth if our ears be open?

The like  may be thought of smelling, for man himself abounding with phlegm, is otherwise affected in smelling than he is, if the parts about the head be full of blood; and many things afford a delightful smell to some living creatures, which smell to other living creatures seemeth not to be so.

In the taste  the same reason appeareth; for to a rough and dry tongue, that very thing seemeth bitter (as in an ague) which to the moister tongue seemeth not to be so. Divers creatures then having tongues drier, or moister, according to their several temperatures, when they taste the same thing, must needs conceit it to be according as the instrument of their taste is affected, either bitter, or sweet, etc. For even as the hand in the striking of the harp, though the stroke be one, yet causeth a sound, sometimes high, sometimes base, according to the quality of the string that is strucken. Even so one and the same outward object is diversly judged of, and conceited, according to the several and divers qualities of the instrument of sense, which conveyeth it to the imagination. Ointment is pleasing to man, but beetles and bees cannot abide it. Oil to man is profitable; but it killeth bees and wasps. Cicuta  feedeth quails, and henbane sows; but both of these hurt man. If a man eat ants he is sick; but the bear being sick, recovereth by eating them. If then one and the very same thing to the red eye seem red, to another pale, and white to another: if one and the same thing, seem not hot or cold, dry or moist, in the same degree to the several creatures which touch it. If one and the self-same sound seem more shrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear, and more base to him that hath an open ear: if the same thing, at the same time, seem to afford a pleasant and displeasant smell to divers and several creatures: if that seem bitter in taste to one, which to another seemeth sweet, that to one hurtful, which to another seemeth healthful, I may report how these things appear divers to several creatures, and seem to produce divers effects.

But what they are in their own nature, whether red or white, bitter or sweet, healthful or hurtful, I cannot tell. For why should I presume to proffer my conceit and imagination, in affirming that a thing is thus, or thus, in its own nature, because it seemeth to me to be so, before the conceit of other living creatures, who may as well think it to be otherwise in each one nature, because it appeareth otherwise to them than it doth to me?

They are living creatures as well as I: why then should I condemn their conceit and phantasy, concerning anything, more than they may mine? They may be in the truth and I in error, as well as I in truth, and they err. If my conceit must be believed before theirs, great reason that it be proved to be truer than theirs. And this proof must be either by demonstration, or without it; without it none will believe; certainly, if by demonstration, then this demonstration must seem to be true, or not seem to be true; if it seem to be true, then will it be a question, whether it be so indeed as it seemeth to be; and to allege that for a certain proof, which is uncertain and questionable, seemeth absurd.

If it be said, that the imagination of man judgeth truer of outward object, than the imagination of other living creatures doth, and therefore to be credited above others (besides that which is already said) this is easily refuted by comparing of man with other creatures.

It is confessed, the dog excelleth man in smell, and in hearing: and whereas there is said to be a twofold discourse, one of the mind, another of the tongue and that of the mind is said to be exercised in chasing that which is convenient, and refusing that which is hurtful in knowledge, justice, and thankfulness: this creature chooseth his food, refuseth the whip, fawneth on his master, defendeth his house, revengeth himself of these strangers that hurt him. And Homer mentioneth Argus,  the dog of Ulysses, who knew his master, having been from home so many years, that at his return, all the people of his house had forgot him. This creature, saith Chrysippus,  is not void of logic: for when in following any beast, he commeth to three several ways, he smelleth to the one, and then to the second, and if he find that the beast which he pursueth be not fled one of these two ways, he presently without smelling any further to it, taketh the third way, which, saith the same philosopher, is as it he reasoned thus, the beast must be gone either this, or this, or the other way; but neither this nor this; ergo, the third: and so away he runneth. If we consider his skill in physic, it is sufficient to help himself; if he be wounded with a dart, he useth the help of his teeth to take it out, of his tongue to cleanse the wound from corruption; he seemeth to be well acquainted with the precept of Hippocrates, who saith, that the rest of the foot is the physic of the foot, and therefore if his foot be hurt, he holdeth it up that it may rest; if he be sick, he giveth himself a vomit by eating of grass, and recovereth himself. The dog then we see is plentifully furnished with inward discourse.

Now outward speech is not needful to make a creature reasonable, else a dumb man were an unreasonable creature.

And do not philosophers themselves reject this as an enemy to knowledge? And therefore they are silent  when they are instructed; and yet even as barbarous and strange people of speech, but we understand it not, neither do we perceive any great difference in their words: but a difference there seemeth to be, and they do express their thoughts and meanings one to another by those words. Even so those creatures, which are commonly called unreasonable, do seem to parley one with another; and by their speech to understand one the other. Do not birds by one kind of speech call their young ones, and by another cause them to hide themselves? Do they not by their several voices express their several passions of joy, of grief, of fear in such manner, that their fellows understand them? Do they not by their voice foreshow things to come? But we will return to that creature we first did instance in. The dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth, another when he howleth, another when he is beaten, and another when he is angry. These creatures then are not void of outward speech.

If then these creatures excel man in sense, and are equal to him in inward and outward discourse, why should not their conceits and imaginations convey the outward object in as true a manner as ours? And if so, then seeing their imaginations are divers, and they conceit it diversly according to their divers temperaments, I may tell what the outward object seemeth to me; but what it seemeth to other creatures, or whether it be indeed that which it seemeth to me, or any other of them, I know not.

But be it granted, that the judgment of man in this case, is to be preferred before the judgment of beasts; yet in men there is great difference; both in respect of the outward shape, and also of the temperature of their bodies: for the body of the Scythian differeth in shape from the body of the Indian, the reason of it ariseth (say the Dogmatics)  from a predominancy of humours in the one more than in the other; and as several humours are predominant, so are the phantasies and conceits severally framed and effected. So that our countrymen delight in one thing, the Indian not in that, but in another which we regard not. This would not be, if their conceits and ours were both alike; for then we should like that which they do, and they would dislike that which we would dislike. It is evident also, that men differ very much in the temperature of their bodies, else why should some more easily digest beef than shellfish? And other be mad for the time, if they drink wine? There was an old woman about Arbeus,  which drunk three drams of cicuta (every dram weighing sixty barley corns, and eight drams to an ounce) without hurt. Lysis, without hurt, took four drams of poppy; and Demophon, which was gentleman-sewer to Alexander, was very cold when he stood in the sun, or in a hot bath; but very hot when he stood in the shadow. Athenagoras felt no pain if a scorpion stung him. And the Psilli (a people in Libya, whose bodies are venom to serpents) if they be stung by serpents, or asps receive no hurt at all.

The Ethiopians, which inhabit the river Hydaspis,  do eat serpents and scorpions without danger. Lothericus  a chirurgeon, at the smell of a sturgeon, would be for the time mad. Andron of Argos was so little thirsty, that without want of drink, he travelled through the hot and dry country of Libya. Tiberius Caesar would see very well in the dark. Aristotle mentioneth of Thratius,  who said, that the image of a man went always before him.

If then it be so, that there be such differences in men, this must be by reason of the divers temperatures they have, and divers disposition of their conceit and imagination; for, if one hate, and another love the very same thing, it must be that their phantasies differ, else all would love it, or all would hate it. These men then, may tell how these things seem to them good, or bad; but what they are in their own nature they cannot tell.

If we will hearken to men’s opinions, concerning one and the same matter, thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it, we shall find this to be impossible; for, either we must believe what all men say of it, or what some men only say of it. To believe what all men say of one and the same thing, is not possible; for then we shall believe contrarieties; for some men say, that that very thing is pleasant, which other say is displeasant. If it be said, we must believe only some men, then let it be showed who those some men are; for the Platonists will believe Plato, but the Epicures Epicurus, the Phytagoreans Pythagorus  and other philosophers, the masters of their own sects: so that it is doubtful, to which of all these we shall give credit. If it be said, that we must credit the greatest number, this seemeth childish, for there may be amongst other nations a greater number which deny that very point, which the greatest number with us do affirm: so that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed.

This argument seemeth to be further confirmed, if the differences of the senses of hearing, seeing, smelling, touching, and tasting be considered; for that the senses differ, it seemeth plain.

Painted tables (in which the art of slanting  is used) appear to the eye, as if the parts of them were some higher, and some lower than the other, but to the touch they seem not to be so.

Honey seemeth to the tongue sweet, but unpleasant to the eye: so ointment doth recreate the smell, but it offendeth the taste. Rain-ater is profitable to the eyes, but it hurteth the lungs. We may tell then, how these things seem to our several senses, but what they are in their own nature we cannot tell: for why should not a man credit any one of his senses as well as the other?

Every object seemeth to be presented diversly unto the several instruments of sense. An apple to the touch seemeth smooth, sweet to the smell, and to the eye yellow; but whether the apple have one of these qualities only, or more than these qualities, who can tell? The organ hath many pipes, all which are filled with the same blast of wind, varied according to the capacity of the several pipes which receive it: even so the quality of the apple may be but one, and that this one quality may be varied, and seem yellow to the eye, to the touch smooth, and sweet to the smell, by reason of the divers instruments of the sense, which apprehend this one quality diversly.

It may be also, that an apple hath many qualities besides; but we are not able to conceive them all; because we want fit means and instruments to apprehend them: for suppose that some man is born blind, and deaf, and yet can touch, smell, and taste; this man will not think that there is anything, which may be seen or heard, because he wanteth the senses of hearing and seeing, he will only think there are those qualities in the object, which by reason of his three senses he conceiveth: even so the apple may have many more qualities; but we cannot come to know them, because we want fit instruments for that purpose.

If it be replied, that nature hath ordained as many instruments of sense, as there are sensible objects; I demand, what nature? For there is a confused controversy about the very essence of nature. Some affirming it to be one thing, others another, few agreeing: so that what the quality of an apple is, or whether it hath one quality or many, I know not.

Let a man also consider, how many things that are separated, and by themselves appear to differ from that which they seem to be, when they are in a mass or lump; the scrapings of the goat’s horn seems white, but in the horn they seem black, but in the lump white. The stone Tenarus,  being polished, seemeth white, but unpolished and rough it seemeth yellow. Sands being separated, appear rough to the touch, but a great heap, soft. I may then report, how these things appear, but whether they are so indeed, I know not.